thought of the Florentine has become a sort of 'unsolved riddle'. In fact, Machiavelli has often been interpreted in a number of different and contrasting ways: sometimes referred to as the ultimate interpreter of Staatsräson [raison d'État] (Meinecke, 1924) or as a true 'master of evil' (Strauss, 1978) , as a neo-pagan and demonic thinker (Ritter, 1947; Voegelin, 1998) or as a humanist imbued with religious republicanism (Viroli, 2010) , as an anti-modern thinker of 'aleatory politics' (Althusser, 1999) or as among the founders of modern politics (Skinner, 1978) . This 'ambiguity of Machiavelli' has long puzzled International Relations (IR) scholars. In Martin Wight's view (1994, p. 16, emphasis added) , for example, Machiavelli would be 'the first man (since the Greeks) to look at politics without ethical presuppositions. He was in a real sense the inventor of Realism' (see also Wight, 2004, pp. 3-28) . According to this reading, Machiavelli would be the one who opened the Pandora's box of modern politics, showing its demonic face: the inability to reconcile and harmonize ethics and politics, two worlds toto caelo different, which it is necessary to keep distinct and distant. As Berlin (1980, pp. 74-75) has aptly put it, 'the scandal of Machiavelli' would stem from his de facto recognition that ends equally ultimate, equally sacred, may contradict each other, that entire systems of value may come into collision without possibility of rational arbitration, and that not merely in exceptional circumstances, as a result of abnormality or accident or error -the clash of Antigone and Creon or in the story of Tristan -but (this was surely new) as part of the normal human situation.
In this sense, then, the 'Machiavellian moment' would represent the 'zero point' of the realist tradition, the dawn of a new thought on politics finally freed from religion and moral values. As a matter of fact, the divide between ethics and politics runs throughout the realist corpus and constantly re-emerges in various guises within this school of thought. Suffice to think of Thomas Hobbes's famous dictum 'Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words', 1 In short, "salus publica suprema lex" would be the assumption behind the whole of Machiavelli's political theory, which would make him the precursor of modern raison d'État. Indeed, when politics and the safety of the state are at stake, 'no considerations of justice or injustice, humanity or cruelty, nor of glory or of shame, should be allowed to prevail' (Machiavelli, 1882, p. 421 Machiavelli's world is therefore imbued with a tragic vision of history and politics.
For the Florentine human passions are immutable as they constantly clash against the invisible and fickle walls of Fortune '(because their nature is to have all and to do everything whilst fortune limits their possessions and capacity of enjoyment) ' (ibid., p. 225) . And yet, and in this too the 'realism of Machiavelli' differs from that of Hobbes, the relationship between freedom and destiny, chance and necessity, fortune and virtue is not simply based on a negative anthropology (man's natural propensity to evil) which becomes the fulcrum upon which the security problem (survival) rests
and that, in turn, politics must address by closing itself and creating geometric (inside/outside) and well-defined political forms (the Leviathan-state). For
Machiavelli, political action cannot be caged in a structure because it depends on the constantly changing relationship between fortune and virtue. Fortune, as Machiavelli explains in a famous passage of The Prince, is a 'dangerous river' that can neither be stemmed nor sealed in a form or in a space. In fact, 'the prince who relies completely upon Fortune will come to ruin as soon as she changes' (Machiavelli, 2005, p. 85) .
But human nature is varied too -although immutable in its plurality of 'faces, temperaments and imaginations' 4 -and for this reason one must find the right balance between circumstances and charisma, turning the chance into necessity, and fortune into virtue:
[…] the man who adapts his method of procedure to the nature of the times will prosper, and likewise, … the man who establishes his procedures out of tune with the times will come to grief. We can observe in the affairs that lead them to the end they seek -that is, towards glory and wealth -that men proceed in different ways: one man with caution, another with impetuousness; one with violence, another with astuteness; one with patience, another with its opposite. Each may achieve his goals with these different means. In the case of two cautious men, we also see that one reaches his goal while the other does not. And likewise, two men prosper equally employing two different means, one being cautious and the other impetuous. This occurs from nothing other than from the quality of the times, that either match or do not match their procedures. (Machiavelli, 2005, p. 85) The problem of the incommensurability between politics and ethics is not therefore a In this sense, then, there is at work in the thought of the Florentine something much more shocking than the mere autonomy of politics from ethics and morality: the momentous discovery that politics and history are not completely rationalizable, that values tend to fall prey to fate and passions, that human nature -unchanging yet plural -will always clash against what is constantly mutable; that Fortune, in short, is a woman without a face that cannot be fixed into a form to be contemplated. It is this complex vision of history and political action, passions and reasons, opportunities and decisions that makes Machiavelli a fundamental thinker of (post)modernity. He is the founder of a political realism and a theory of modernity alternative to those of Hobbes and Rousseau, which are entirely based on social control and social contract (see Galli, 2009; Del Lucchese, 2011) . Therein lies, in our opinion, the reasons to reread
Machiavelli in the age of the crisis of the state, of compressed temporality, and of unstructured immanence.
However, apart for 'a few, well-known maxims', and some notable exceptions, the 'Machiavellian moment' in IR has not generated a number of studies truly commensurate to the standing of this important thinker. Indeed, while other 'classics'
of international theory -such as Thucydides, Grotius, Hobbes and Kant, to name just a few -have been subject of numerous studies, 'Machiavelli has, by and large, been neglected by contemporary students of international relations' (Cesa, 2014, p. 1) .
Even the engagement by post-positivist scholars after the 'critical turn' in IR Theory of the early 1990s did not prove long-lasting and ran out of steam soon after it was initiated (Walker, 1991 (Walker, , 1993 Gill, 2000; Hoadley, 2001) . Faithful to Machiavelli's lesson, and to its principle of 'determinable indeterminacy' of politics, the contributors have tried to re-assess his legacy and ideas aware that -as Kenneth Waltz (2001, p. 212 ) put it -'the great political philosophers demand being read and read again, and one finds that each rereading brings an enlarged and deepened understanding'.
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